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Abstract The TREC 2009 web ad hoc and relevance feedback tasks used a new doc-
ument collection, the ClueWeb09 dataset, which was crawled from the general Web in
early 2009. This dataset contains 1 billion web pages, a substantial fraction of which
are spam — pages designed to deceive search engines so as to deliver an unwanted pay-
load. We examine the effect of spam on the results of the TREC 2009 web ad hoc and
relevance feedback tasks, which used the ClueWeb09 dataset. We show that a simple
content-based classifier with minimal training is efficient enough to rank the “spam-
miness” of every page in the dataset using a standard personal computer in 48 hours,
and effective enough to yield significant and substantive improvements in the fixed-
cutoff precision (estP10) as well as rank measures (estR-Precision, StatMAP, MAP) of
nearly all submitted runs. Moreover, using a set of “honeypot” queries the labeling of
training data may be reduced to an entirely automatic process. The results of classical
information retrieval methods are particularly enhanced by filtering — from among
the worst to among the best.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that a vast number of web pages are created for the purpose of surrepti-
tiously causing a search engine to deliver an unwelcome payload [10]. Broadly speaking,
this purpose is effected by two mechanisms: self promotion and mutual promotion. A
common form of self-promotion is word stuffing, in which gratuitous (often invisible to
the reader) keywords are inserted to improve the retrieved rank of the page. A common
form of mutual promotion is the link farm, in which a large number plausible-looking
pages reference one another so as to improve a topic-independent quality score such as
page rank. Often, the content of both kinds of spam pages is mechanically generated
or plagiarized.
We are concerned with measuring and mitigating the effect of spam pages on
retrieval effectiveness, as illustrated by two TREC 20091 tasks that use the new
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2ClueWeb09 dataset2. The first of these tasks is the ad hoc task of the Web Track [4].
The second task is the Relevance Feedback Track task, which evaluated relevance feed-
back techniques through a two-phase experimental protocol. Relevance judgments were
provided to the participants after Phase 1, for use in Phase 2.
Definitions of Web spam typically focus on those pages that contain deceptive or
harmful content. The authors of such spam pages may attempt to subvert the ranking
algorithm of a search engine by presenting a false impression of relevance. However,
“defining Web spam is not as straightforward as it might seem” [10], and it is often
unclear whether a page is genuinely malicious or merely of low quality. We avoid
considerations of author intent by employing a broad definition of Web spam that
encompasses low-quality “junk” pages, those which are unlikely to be judged relevant
to any query that might reasonably retrieve them.
The ClueWeb09 dataset was crawled from the general Web in early 2009, and
contains roughly 1 billion pages written in a number of languages. The TREC tasks
were concerned only with the English subset of about 500 million pages. Furthermore,
several sub-tasks used a “Category B” subset containing about 50 million pages. The
full set of 1 billion pages was dubbed “Category A.” To our knowledge, all TREC
participants submitting Category A runs used at most the 500 million page, English
subset of ClueWeb09. The relevance feedback track specifically limited Category A
runs to the English subset.
The literature lacks quantitative studies of the impact of spam and spam filtering
on retrieval effectiveness. The AIRWeb Web Spam Challenge series3 has measured
the effectiveness of various methods at identifying spam hosts, but not the overall
contribution of these methods to retrieval effectiveness. The Web Spam Challenge and
other studies use two datasets prepared by Yahoo for the purpose: WEBSPAM-UK2006
and WEBSPAM-UK20074. Each of these datasets consists of a crawl of a portion of
the .uk web space, with spam or non-spam labels for a sample of a few thousand of
the hosts represented in each crawl. To our knowledge, the only study of retrieval
effectiveness using the WEBSPAM corpora [14] shows that users prefer spam-filtered
results to unfiltered ones, but offers no relevance-based measurement of the impact of
spam. The same authors investigate the properties that a collection should have to
evaluate the effectiveness of “spam nullification” [15].
Previous TREC Web IR evaluation efforts have used corpora largely devoid of
spam. For example, the TREC Terabyte track used a collection of government web
pages [2]. Spam has been identified as an issue in the Blog Track [20], but its impact
has not been systematically studied. The use of the ClueWeb09 dataset places the
spam issue front and center at TREC for the first time. At least three participants [17,
18,11] used spam filters of some sort; one from a commercial search provider. Other
participants noted the impact of spam on their efforts, particularly for Category A
tasks [13,16,21].
Our objectives in undertaking this work were twofold: 1) to develop a practical
method of labeling every page in ClueWeb09 as spam or not, and 2) to quantify the
quality of the labeling by its impact on the effectiveness of contemporary IR methods.
Our results are:
2 boston.lti.cs.cmu.edu/Data/clueweb09
3 webspam.lip6.fr/wiki/pmwiki.php
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3– Several complete sets of spam labels, available for download without restriction.
Each label is a percentile score which may be used in combination with a threshold
to classify a page as “spam” or “not spam”, or may be used to rank the page with
respect to others by “spamminess.”
– A general process for labeling large web datasets, which requires minimal compu-
tation, and minimal training.
– A variant of the process is unsupervised, in that it uses automatically labeled
training examples, with no human adjudication.
– A variant uses training examples from a four-year-old, dissimilar, and much
smaller collection.
– A variant uses only 2.5 hours of human adjudication to label representative
training examples.
– A variant combines all of the above to yield a superior meta-ranking.
– Measurements that show a significant and substantive positive impact on precision
at fixed cutoff, when the labels are used to remove spammy documents from all
runs officially submitted by participants to the TREC Web adhoc and relevance
feedback task.
– A method to automatically reorder, rather than simply to filter, the runs.
– Measurments that use 50-fold cross-validation to show a significant and substan-
tive positive impact or reordering at all cutoff levels, and on rank-based summary
measures.
Our measurements represent the first systematic study of spam in a dataset of the
the magnitude of ClueWeb09, and the first quantitative results of the impact of spam
filtering on IR effectiveness. Over and above the particular methods and measurements,
our results serve as a baseline and benchmark for further investigation. New sets of
labels may be compared to ours by the impact they have on effectiveness. Different
methods of harnessing the labels — such as using them as a feature in learning to
rank — may be compared to ours.
2 Context
Given the general consensus in the literature that larger collections yield higher preci-
sion [12], we expected the precision at rank 10 (P@10) scores for the TREC 2009 web
ad hoc task to be high (P@10> 0.5), especially for the Category A dataset. Contrary
to our expectations, the Category A results were poor (P@10 for all Cat A submitted
runs: µ = 0.25, σ = 0.11,max = 0.41). The Category B results were better (P@10
for all Cat B submitted runs: µ = 0.38, σ = 0.07,max = 0.56), but still short of our
expectation.
The authors represent two groups, X [7] and Y [24], that participated in TREC
2009, employing distinct retrieval methods. In the course of developing a novel method,
group X composed a set of 67 pilot queries (Figure 1) and, for each, informally adjudi-
cated the top few results from Category A. The results were terrible, the vast majority
being spam. At the time, we took this to be a shortcoming of our method and reworked
it using pseudo-relevance feedback from Wikipedia to yield higher quality results, which
we characterized as “not terrible.”
Group Y achieved satisfactory results (P@10=0.52) in Phase 1 of the relevance
feedback (RF) task, which mandated Category B. In the final results, group X achieved
4Table 1 Pilot Queries composed prior to TREC 2009.
star wars money spinal tap apple fish
star wars sdi spinal tap apple records fishing
star wars luke spinal tap procedure apple computer go fish
sdi spinal tap lyrics macintosh fish episodes
selective disseminatinon jaguar macintosh apple whip
spock jaguar xj apple macintosh whip egg
spock kirk jaguar cat dead poets whip crop
spock benjamin jaguar fender vacuum whip topping
obama fender vacuum cleaner party whip
obama japan fender bender high vacuum whip it
barack obama fender gibson vacuum bull whip
capital gates stream WHIP 1350 AM
capital city gates fences stream process whip flagellate
capital assets gates steve stream creek chain whip
money windows stream education The Whip
money pink floyd windows doors honda stream whip antenna
money beatles windows os WHIP walks hits
inning pitched
Table 2 Group X and Group Y estimates of spam prevalence in top-ranked documents. Both
estimates show that spam is highly prevalent in both Category A and Category B documents;
more so in Category A.
Group X Group Y
Category A 612/756 = 0.81 (0.78 - 0.84) 295/461 = 0.63 (0.59 - 0.68)
Category B 47/74 = 0.64 (0.52 - 0.74) 120/263 = 0.46 (0.39 - 0.52)
strong performance on the Category A ad hoc task (P@10=0.38), while group Y did
not (P@10=0.16). These results were surprising, as group Y’s submission used exactly
the same search engine and parameters as for relevance feedback — the only difference
was the use of Category A instead of Category B.
A plausible explanation for these observations is that the TREC submissions were,
in general, adversely affected by spam, and that the Category A collection has a higher
proportion of spam than Category B. To validate this explanation, we first sought
to quantify our observation that the top-ranked pages returned by our methods were
dominated by spam. We then sought to find an automatic method to abate spam, and
to evaluate the impact of that method on retrieval effectiveness.
To quantify the amount of spam returned, we constructed a web-based evaluation
interface (Figure 1) and used it to adjudicate a number of the top-ranked pages returned
during our preliminary investigation. Group X adjudicated 756 pages in total, selected
at random with replacement from the top ten results for each of the 67 pilot topics.
Group Y adjudicated 461 pages, selected at random with replacement from the top
ten results for their Category A and Category B relevance feedback runs. These efforts
consumed 2 hrs. 20 mins. and 1 hr. 20 mins. respectively. The results, shown with
95% confidence intervals in Table 2, indicate a high proportion of spam for the results
of both groups in both categories. It follows that this high proportion of spam must
have a substantial adverse effect on precision. As anticipated, the proportion of spam
is higher in the Category A results.
5Fig. 1 User interface for adjudicating spamminess of CluWeb09 pages.
3 Evaluation Measures
The Group X and Group Y examples are entirely independent from each other, as
they are derived from different topics and different retrieval methods, and assessed by
different individuals. Furthermore, the Group X examples are independent of TREC,
as the topics and pages were determined beforehand. For this reason, it is appropriate
to use the Group X examples for training and tuning, and the Group Y examples for
evaluation.
But evaluation on the Group Y examples answers only the narrow question, “How
well can a spam filter identify spam in the pages returned by one particular method?”
We are interested in the broader questions, “How well can a spam filter identify non-
relevant pages?” and “What is the impact of removing or reranking these pages on
retrieval effectiveness in general?”
For each of these questions, we require a suitable evaluation measure. For the first
two — how well a filter identifies spam and nonrelevant documents — we use AUC, the
area under the receiver operating characteristic curve. AUC— a threshold-independent
measure of classifier effectiveness — has been used as the primary measure in previous
web and email spam filtering evaluation efforts [6]. Our choice of evaluation measure for
the third question — how well a filter improves retrieval effectiveness — was constrained
by the sparsity of relevance assessments for TREC 2009. For the Category A ad hoc
and relevance feedback tasks, the top-ranked 12 documents for each submitted run
were assessed, as well as a stratified random sample of the rest. Precision at cutoff 10
(P@10) was reported as the primary retrieval effectiveness measure. These reported
results serve as the baseline for our evaluation of filter impact.
Once documents are eliminated due to spam filtering, it is no longer the case that
there are assessments for the top-ranked 12 documents, as lower ranked ones (which
may not be assessed) rise in the ranking. It is therefore necessary to estimate P@10
for the filtered results, in order to compare them to the baseline. Furthermore, the
6Category B baseline must be estimated, as only a sample of the documents submitted
for Category B submissions was assessed. We considered four methods of estimating
P@10:
– unjudged-nrel. Unadjudicated documents considered to be nonrelevant. This method
underestimates P@10.
– unjudged-elided. Unadjudicated documents are elided, and P@10 is computed on
the top-ranked 10 documents that are adjudicated [23]. This method may under-
estimate P@10 because lower ranked documents are evaluated in place of higher
ranked ones. Or it may overestimate P@10 because the elided documents are less
likely to be relevant due to selection bias.
– statPC10. An intermediate calculation in the statAP method [3]:
statPC10 =
statrel10
10
(1)
where statrel10 is a sample-based estimate of the number of relevant documents in
the top-ranked 10. We determined experimentally that this method underestimates
P@10 when the number of assessed documents is small. It yields an inexact estimate
of P@10 even when the top 10 documents are fully adjudicated, and sometimes
yields the absurd result statPC10 > 1.
– estP10. A sparse set-based estimate used for the TREC Legal Track [26]:
estP10 =
estrel10
max(estrel10 + estnrel10, 1)
(2)
where,
estrel10 = min(statrel10, 10− nrel10) (3)
and
estnrel10 = min(statnrel10, 10− rel10). (4)
Both statrel10 and statnrel10 are sample-based estimates of the number of relevant
and non-relevant documents in the top-ranked 10, and rel10 and nrel10 are exact
counts of the number of assessed relevant and non-relevant documents in the top-
ranked 10. The estP10 measure yields more stable results than statPC10 and has
the property that estP10 = P@10 when the top 10 documents are fully adjudicated.
Moreover, it is nearly symmetric and therefore less likely to be biased: When none
of the 10 documents is judged, estP10 = 0; otherwise, estP10 = 1− estP10 where
estP10 is calculated by complementing all judgements.
The results reported here use estP10 as the primary retrieval effectiveness measure,
computed using the TREC Legal Track evaluation software l07 eval version 2.05.
The other three measures produce similar results and lead to the same conclusions. We
briefly compare estP10 with the other measures in Section 5.
The estP10 measure estimates the effectiveness of retrieval for one specific task:
identifying ten likely relevant documents. While this view of effectiveness is not un-
reasonable for web search, we are also concerned with effectiveness at cutoff values
other than ten, and more generally rank measures that summarize effectiveness over
5 trec-legal.umiacs.umd.edu
7many cutoff values. The most commonly used rank measure is mean average precision
(MAP) which is the mean of average precision (AP) over all topics:
AP =
1
R
∑
k
P@k · rel(k) , (5)
where rel(k) = 1 if the kth-ranked document in the run is relevant; 0 if it is not. R is
the total number of relevant documents in the collection.
Unfortunately, R is unknown for the TREC 09 tasks. Furthermore, rel(k) is un-
known for most k, in particular most k > 12. Methods to estimate AP with incomplete
knowledge of rel(k) have proven to be unreliable for the TREC 09 tasks [private cor-
respondence, Web Track coordinators].
A more straightforward rank effectiveness measure is R-precision, (RP) which is
simply
RP = P@R . (6)
While R-precision depends on R, R is not a direct factor in the formula, so estimation
errors have much lower impact. Furthermore, estRP is easily computed:
estRP = estP@estR . (7)
Regardless of whether AP or RP or some other rank effectiveness measure is used,
if our reranking improves estPk for all values of k, it follows that the rank measure is
improved. Therefore, as our primary evaluation of the effectiveness of spam reranking,
we compute estPk for representative values of k. As our best effort to quantify the
magnitude of the effect, we present estRP as well. Furthermore, we evaluate StatMAP,
MAP (unjudged nonrelevant), and MAP (unjudged elided).
4 Spam Filter Design
Our principal criteria in choosing a spam filter design were efficiency and effectiveness.
By efficiency, we mean the end-to-end time and resource consumption (both human
and computer) to label the corpus. By effectiveness, we mean the ability to identify
spam (and hence nonrelevant) pages among those retrieved documents and thus to
improve precision by deleting it.
Although the literature is dominated by graph-based methods for web spam filtering
and static ranking [1,22], content-based email spam filters were found to work as well
as graph-based methods in the 2007 Web Spam Challenge [5]. Furthermore, these
filters are very fast, being able to classify thousands of documents per second. Our
implementation required about 48 hours elapsed time to decompress, decode and score
the 500M English ClueWeb09 pages on a standard PC with Intel dual core E7400 CPU.
We used three different sets of training examples to create three filters, each of
which was used to label the entire corpus; in addition, we created an ensemble filter
using a naive Bayes metaclassifier to combine the results:
– UK2006. The WEBSPAM-UK2006 corpus, used for the AIRWeb Web Spam Chal-
lenge and other studies, contains spam and nonspam labels for 8238 hosts. For each
spam host and each nonspam host, we selected the first page in the corpus whose
size was at least 5K bytes. This approach tends to select an important page near
the root of the host’s web space. Our training set consisted of 767 spam pages and
8Table 3 Top 40 queries from the 1000 queries used for the Britney training examples.
1. britney spears 11. pamela anderson 21. ipod 31. carmen electra
2. youtube 12. angelina jolie 22. coach 32. wikipedia
3. facebook 13. lindsay lohan 23. american idol 33. runescape
4. wwe 14. jennifer hallett 24. nfl 34. pokemon
5. barack obama 15. hi-5 25. jessica alba 35. hannah montana
6. kim kardashian 16. clay aiken 26. miley cyrus 36. john mccain
7. myspace 17. iphone 27. limewire 37. online dictionary
8. sarah palin 18. xbox 360 28. dragonball 38. stock market
9. naruto 19. wii 29. megan fox 39. club penguin
10. paris hilton 20. psp 30. nba 40. webkinz
7474 nonspam pages — one for each spam host and one for each nonspam host.
Our aim in using this set of training examples was to investigate the efficacy of
transfer learning from an older, smaller, less representative corpus.
– Britney. Our second set of training examples was essentially generated automati-
cally, requiring no manual labeling of spam pages. We asked ourselves, “If we were
spammers, where would we find keywords to put into our pages to attract the most
people?” We started looking for lists of popular searches and found an excellent
source at a search engine optimization (SEO) site6. This particular SEO site collects
the daily published “popular search queries” from the major web search engines,
retailers, and social tagging sites. We used their collected Google Trends, Yahoo!
Buzz, Ask, Lycos, and Ebay Pulse queries. We downcased all queries and took the
top 1000 for the year 2008, the period immediately before the ClueWeb09 corpus
was crawled. The most popular query was “britney spears” and hence the name of
this training data. Table 3 shows other query examples. We used the #combine oper-
ator in Indri [25] to perform naive query likelihood retrievals from Category A with
these 1000 queries. We used the same index and retrieval parameters as [24]. For
each query, we took the top ten documents and summarily labeled them as spam,
with no human adjudication. We fetched the Open Directory Project archive7 and
intersected its links with the URIs found in ClueWeb09. From this intersection,
we selected 10,000 examples which we summarily labeled as nonspam, with no hu-
man adjudication. Our rationale for using this set of training examples was derived
from the observation that our naive methods retrieved almost all spam, using the
queries that we composed prior to TREC. We surmised that popular queries would
be targeted by spammers, and thus yield an even higher proportion of spam — high
enough that any non-spam would be within the noise tolerance limits of our spam
filter. In effect, the SEO queries acted as a “honeypot” to attract spam.
– Group X. We used the 756 documents adjudicated by Group X as training examples
(table 2, column 1). Recall that these documents were selected without knowledge
of the TREC topics or relevance assessments. Our objective was to determine how
well a cursory labeling of messages selected from the actual corpus would work.
– Fusion. The scores yielded by the three filters were interpreted as log-odds estimates
and averaged, in effect yielding a naive Bayes combination of the three scores. This
approach is known to be effective for both email and web spam filtering [5,19].
We expected all the filters to identify spam better than chance, but had no prediction
as to which set of training examples would work best. In particular, we did not know
6 www.seomoz.org/popular-searches/index/2008-mm-dd
7 rdf.dmoz.org
9how well training on the UK2006 examples would transfer to ClueWeb09 due to the
differences in the times of the crawls, the hosts represented, and the representativeness
of the host-based labels. We did not know how well “pages retrieved by a naive method
in response to a popular query” would act as proxies for spam, or how overfitted to the
particular queries the results would be. Similarly, we did not know how well ODP pages
would act as proxies for non-spam. We did not know if the Group X examples were
sufficiently numerous, representative, or carefully labeled to yield a good classifier. We
did have reason to think that the fusion filter might outperform all the rest, consistent
with previously reported results.
4.1 Filter operation
A linear classifier was trained using on-line gradient-descent logistic regression in a
single pass over the training examples [9]. The classifier was then applied to the English
portion of the ClueWeb09 dataset end-to-end, yielding a spamminess score for each
successive page p. Owing to the use of logistic regression for training, the spamminess
score may be interpreted as a log-odds estimate:
score(p) ≈ log
Pr[p is spam]
Pr[p is nonspam]
. (8)
However, this estimate is likely to be biased by the mismatch between training and
test examples. Nonetheless, a larger score indicates a higher likelihood of spam, and
the sum of independent classifier scores is, modulo an additive constant, a naive Bayes
estimate of the combined log-odds.
For the purpose of comparing effectiveness, we convert each score to a percentile
rank over the 503,903,810 English pages:
percentile(p) =
⌊
100
|p′|score(p′) ≥ score(p)|
503, 903, 810
⌋
. (9)
That is, the set of pages with percentile(p) < t represents the spammiest t% of the
corpus. In the results below, we measure effectiveness for t ∈ [0, 100], where t = 0 filters
nothing and t = 100 filters everything.
4.2 Filter implementation
The implementation of the classifier and update rule are shown in Figure 2. Apart from
file I/O and other straightforward housekeeping code, these figures contain the full
implementation of the filter.8 The function train() should be called on each training
example. After training, the function spamminess() returns a log-odds estimate of the
probability that the page is spam.
Each page, including WARC and HTTP headers, was treated as flat text. No to-
kenization, parsing, or link analysis was done. Pages exceeding 35,000 bytes in length
8 Figure 2 is Copyright c© 2010 Gordon V. Cormack. This code is free software: you can
redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as pub-
lished by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or (at your option)
any later version.
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Fig. 2 C implementation of the filter. The function spamminess is the soft linear classifier
used for spam filtering. The function train implements the online logistic regression gradient
descent training function.
#define P 1000081
#define PREF 35000
float w[P];
unsigned dun[P], cookie;
float spamminess(unsigned char *page, int n){
unsigned i, b, h;
cookie++;
if (n > PREF) n = PREF;
float score=0;
b = (page[0]<<16) | (page[1]<<8) | page[2];
for (i=3;i<n;i++){
b = (b<<8) | page[i];
h = b %
if (dun[h] == cookie) continue;
dun[h] = cookie;
score += w[h];
}
return score;
}
#define delta 0.002
train(unsigned char *page, int n, int IsSpam){
unsigned i, b, h;
if (n > PREF) n = PREF;
float p=1/(1+exp(-spamminess(page,n)));
cookie++;
b = (page[0]<<16) | (page[1]<<8) | page[2];
for (i=3;i<n;i++){
b = (b<<8) | page[i];
h = b %
if (dun[h] == cookie) continue;
dun[h] = cookie;
w[h] += (IsSpam-p) * delta;
}
}
were arbitrarily truncated to this length. Overlapping byte 4-grams were used as fea-
tures. That is, if the page consisted of “pq xyzzy” the features would be simply “pq x”,
“q xy”, “ xyz ”, “xyzz”, and “yzzy”. Each feature was represented as a binary quantity
indicating its presence or absence in the page. Term and document frequencies were
not used. Finally, the feature space was reduced from 4× 109 to 106 dimensions using
hashing and ignoring collisions. This brutally simple approach to feature engineering
was used for one of the best filters in the TREC 2007 email spam filtering task [8],
giving us reason to think it would work here.
Given a page p represented by a feature vector Xp a linear classifier computes
score(p) = β ·Xp (10)
where the weight vector β is inferred from training examples. For the particular case
of on-line gradient-descent logistic regression, the inference method is quite simple. β
is initialized to 0, and for each training document p in arbitrary order, the following
11
Table 4 ROC Area (AUC) and 95% confidence intervals for three base filters, plus the naive
Bayes fusion of the three. The “Relevance” column reflects the ability of the filter to remove
non-relevant documents.
Category A Category B
Spam Relevance Spam Relevance
UK2006 0.94 (0.91 - 0.95) 0.85 (0.81 - 0.88) 0.90 (0.86 - 0.93) 0.79 (0.73 - 0.84)
Britney 0.88 (0.85 - 0.91) 0.87 (0.84 - 0.90) 0.80 (0.75 - 0.84) 0.78 (0.74 - 0.83)
GroupX 0.92 (0.89 - 0.94) 0.91 (0.88 - 0.94) 0.89 (0.84 - 0.93) 0.87 (0.83 - 0.91)
Fusion 0.95 (0.93 - 0.97) 0.93 (0.90 - 0.95) 0.94 (0.91 - 0.96) 0.86 (0.83 - 0.92)
update rule is applied:
β ← β + δXp
(
isspam(p)−
1
1 + e−score(p)
)
, where (11)
isspam(p) =
{
1 p is spam
0 p is nonspam
. (12)
We fixed the learning rate parameter δ = 0.002 based on prior experience with email
spam and other datasets.
5 Filter Results
We first consider how well the four filters identify spam, and how well they rank
for static relevance. We then consider the impact on the TREC 2009 web ad hoc
submissions on average, and the impact on the individual submissions. Finally, we
consider the impact on the TREC 2009 relevance feedback submissions.
Figure 3 shows the effectiveness of the UK2006 filter at identifying spam in the
examples labeled by Group Y. The top and middle panels show the fraction of spam
pages identified, and the fraction of nonspam pages identified, as a function of the
percentile threshold. For a good filter, the lines should be far apart, indicating that
a great deal of spam can be eliminated while losing little nonspam. The two panels
indicate that the filter is effective, but do little to quantify how far apart the lines
are. The bottom panel plots the first curve as a function of the second — it is a
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The area under the curve (AUC) – a
number between 0 and 1 — indicates the effectiveness of the filter. The results (0.94
for Category A and 0.90 for Category B) are surprisingly good, comparable to the best
reported for the 2007 AIRWeb Challenge. AUC results for this and the other three
filters are shown, with 95% confidence intervals, in Table 4. These results indicate that
all filters are strong performers, with UK2006 and GroupX perhaps slightly better at
identifying spam than Britney. The fusion filter, as predicted, is better still.
Figure 4 shows the filter’s effectiveness at identifying nonrelevant documents, as
opposed to spam. To measure nonrelevance, we use the same documents discovered
by Group Y, but the official TREC relevance assessments instead of Group Y’s spam
labels. We see that the curves are well separated and the AUC scores are only slightly
lower than those for spam identification. Table 4 summarizes the AUC results for both
spam and static relevance.
We would expect high correlation between documents identified as spam and doc-
uments assessed to be non-relevant, but were surprised nonetheless by how well the
12
Fig. 3 Effect of filtering on elimination of spam and nonspam. The top and centre columns
show the fraction of spam and nonspam eliminated as a function of the fraction of the corpus
that is labeled “spam.” The bottom panel shows the corresponding ROC curves.
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Fig. 4 Effect of filtering on elimination of nonrelevant and relevant pages. The top and centre
columns show the fraction of nonrelevant and relevant pages eliminated as a function of the
fraction of the corpus that is labeled “spam.” The bottom panel shows the corresponding ROC
curves.
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Fig. 5 Effect of spam filtering on the average effectiveness of all Web Track ad hoc submissions,
Category A and Category B. Effectiveness is shown as precision at 10 documents returned
(P@10) as a function of the fraction of the corpus that is labeled “spam”.
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filter worked for this purpose. These results suggest that spam is a strong predictor —
perhaps the principal predictor – of nonrelevance in the results returned by a search
engine.
To evaluate the impact of filtering on retrieval effectiveness, we acquired from the
TREC organizers all submissions for the TREC 2009 web ad hoc and relevance feedback
tasks. We applied the four filters — and also a random control — for threshold settings
of t ∈ 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90. The random control simply labeled t% of the
corpus at random to be spam. Our prediction was that for an effective filter, estP10
should increase with t and eventually fall off. For the random control, estP10 should
either remain flat or fall off slightly, assuming the submissions obey the probability
ranking principle.
Figure 5 shows estP10, averaged over all official TREC submissions, as a function
of t for each of the filters. All (except the control) rise substantially and then fall off
as predicted. The control appears to rise insubstantially, and then fall off. It is entirely
possible that the rise is due to chance, or that the probability ranking is compromised
by the presence of very highly ranked spam. 95% confidence intervals are given for
15
Fig. 6 Effect of spam filtering on the effectiveness of individual Web Track ad hoc submissions,
Category A and Category B. The top scatterplot shows P@10 with 70% of the corpus labeled
“spam” by the fusion method; the bottom scatterplot shows P@10 with 50% of the corpus
labeled “spam” by the fusion method. The correlations with 95% confidence intervals for the
top and bottom plots respectively are 0.09 (-0.24–0.40) and 0.60 (0.34–0.79).
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the control, but omitted for the other filters as their superiority is overwhelmingly
significant (p 0.001).
All filters behave as predicted. estP10 increases to t = 50, at which point the
UK2006 filter starts to fall off. Beyond t = 50, the other filters continue to improve for
Category A, and plateau for Category B. As expected, the fusion filter is superior to
the rest, reaching peak effectiveness at t = 70 for Category A and t = 50 for Category
B. The fusion filter with these threshold settings is used to illustrate the impact on
individual TREC submissions.
The UK2006 filter is trained on documents from a different corpus, which exclude
corpus-specific information like WARC and HTTP headers. The strong performance
of this filter — notwithstanding the falloff at high thresholds — is evidence that spam,
and not some artifact of the data itself, is responsible for the results presented here.
Figure 6 shows a scatterplot comparing unfiltered with filtered estP10 results.
Nearly every submission is improved by filtering. The left panel (Category A) is partic-
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Table 5 Effect of spam filtering on the TREC web ad hoc submissions, Category A. Shown
are the estP10 results for 3 threshold settings of the fusion filter: 0% (no filtering), 50%, and
70%.
estP10
Run ID No filter 50% filter 70% filter
MS1 0.3540 0.4042 0.4273
MS2 0.4060 0.4241 0.4414
MSRAAF 0.3540 0.4195 0.4522
MSRAC 0.4000 0.4368 0.4710
MSRANORM 0.3700 0.4286 0.4652
Sab9wtBase 0.2260 0.3147 0.3720
Sab9wtBf1 0.2880 0.3572 0.4277
Sab9wtBf2 0.2620 0.3562 0.3878
THUIR09An 0.3740 0.4191 0.4372
THUIR09LuTA 0.2100 0.3270 0.3688
THUIR09TxAn 0.3640 0.4699 0.4873
UMHOObm25GS 0.1420 0.3918 0.4073
UMHOObm25IF 0.1640 0.3084 0.3359
UMHOOqlGS 0.1180 0.3832 0.4024
UMHOOqlIF 0.1080 0.3994 0.3849
WatSdmrm3 0.1180 0.3916 0.4490
WatSdmrm3we 0.1640 0.5913 0.5725
WatSql 0.0840 0.4207 0.4416
muadanchor 0.3519 0.4313 0.4678
muadibm5 0.2788 0.3737 0.3864
muadimp 0.3006 0.3760 0.3988
pkuLink 0.1160 0.4786 0.5330
pkuSewmTp 0.1480 0.3771 0.3704
pkuStruct 0.1460 0.3753 0.3710
twCSrs9N 0.2080 0.3821 0.4104
twCSrsR 0.1800 0.4428 0.4403
twJ48rsU 0.2380 0.3296 0.3323
uogTrdphP 0.1680 0.4369 0.4075
uvaee 0.1100 0.4444 0.4499
uvamrf 0.0940 0.4113 0.4420
uvamrftop 0.4100 0.4903 0.4935
watprf 0.3360 0.3342 0.3553
watrrfw 0.3760 0.3774 0.3813
watwp 0.3516 0.3476 0.3396
yhooumd09BFM 0.1640 0.3984 0.3933
yhooumd09BGC 0.3840 0.5049 0.4472
yhooumd09BGM 0.4040 0.4819 0.4198
ularly remarkable as it shows no significant correlation between filtered and unfiltered
results for particular runs (95% confidence interval: −0.24−0.40). That is, the effect of
spam filtering overwhelms any other differences among the submissions. Tables 5 and
6 respectively report the results of the fusion filter for the individual Category A and
Category B ad hoc runs.
Figure 7 illustrates the dramatic impact of spam filtering on our simple query
likelihood method. In Category A, our submission is improved from the worst unfil-
tered result to better than the best unfiltered result. In Category B, the same method
(which was not an official submission to TREC) sees a less dramatic but substantial
improvement.
Figure 8 shows the effect of filtering on the relevance feedback runs. The baseline
results are stronger, but still improved substantially by filtering.
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Table 6 Effect of spam filtering on the TREC web ad hoc submissions, Category B. Shown
are the estP10 results for 3 threshold settings of the fusion filter: 0% (no filtering), 50%, and
70%.
estP10
Run ID No filter 50% filter 70% filter
ICTNETADRun3 0.4332 0.5715 0.5438
ICTNETADRun4 0.4402 0.4951 0.5150
ICTNETADRun5 0.3907 0.4851 0.5076
IE09 0.3864 0.4092 0.4238
NeuLMWeb300 0.4557 0.4984 0.4587
NeuLMWeb600 0.4096 0.5038 0.4714
NeuLMWebBase 0.3040 0.4796 0.4604
RmitLm 0.3307 0.5023 0.4526
RmitOkapi 0.3509 0.4249 0.3949
SIEL09 0.3784 0.4012 0.4158
UCDSIFTinter 0.4286 0.4322 0.4478
UCDSIFTprob 0.3849 0.4222 0.4106
UCDSIFTslide 0.4248 0.4315 0.4459
UDWAxBL 0.3166 0.4238 0.3940
UDWAxQE 0.3369 0.3175 0.2884
UDWAxQEWeb 0.4625 0.5562 0.5157
UMHOObm25B 0.3846 0.5114 0.4691
UMHOOqlB 0.3449 0.5098 0.4506
UMHOOsd 0.4033 0.5315 0.5103
UMHOOsdp 0.4033 0.5335 0.5123
UamsAw7an3 0.3766 0.4546 0.4521
UamsAwebQE10 0.3142 0.4643 0.4324
arsc09web 0.2254 0.2813 0.2073
irra1a 0.2776 0.4666 0.4320
irra2a 0.2905 0.3827 0.4123
irra3a 0.2893 0.4699 0.4396
scutrun1 0.3362 0.3839 0.4539
scutrun2 0.3474 0.3841 0.4283
scutrun3 0.3358 0.3960 0.4466
udelIndDMRM 0.3312 0.5223 0.4846
udelIndDRPR 0.2811 0.3899 0.3653
udelIndDRSP 0.3469 0.4917 0.4616
uogTrdphA 0.4548 0.5119 0.4581
uogTrdphCEwP 0.5389 0.5664 0.5496
Figure 9 recasts the superior and inferior curves from Figure 5 in terms of the other
three measures. The overall effect is the same for all measures: filtering substantially
improves P@10 over baseline for a wide range of threshold settings.
6 Reranking Method
In the experiments reported in the previous section, we used the score returned by our
classifier in the crudest possible way: as a brick wall filter that effectively eliminates
some fraction of the corpus from consideration. Here, we consider instead the problem
of using the spam scores to reorder the ranked list of documents returned by a search
engine.
In reranking, we do not eliminate documents with high scores; instead we move
them lower in the ranking. Presumably, documents with extreme scores should be
18
Fig. 7 Effect of filtering on naive query likelihood language model runs.
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moved more than others, but by how much? Our approach is to use supervised learning
to compute the best new ranking, given the original ranking and the spam percentile
scores.
Supervised learning requires training examples. In a real-world deployment, the
training examples would be constructed by adjudicating the results of historical queries
presented to the same search engine. For our experiments, we have no historical re-
sults — only those from the 50 topics used at TREC 2009, which have no particular
historical order. We therefore use 50-fold cross-validation, using one topic at a time
for evaluation, and considering the remaining 49 to be historical examples. The evalu-
ation results from these 50 separate experiments – each reranking the results for one
topic — are then averaged.
Our learning method, more properly learning-to-rank method, consists of exhaus-
tive enumeration to compute, for all k, the threshold tk that optimizes estPk:
tk = argmax
t
estPk where t = tk . (13)
19
Fig. 8 Effect of spam filtering on the average effectiveness of all relevance feedback task Phase
2 submissions, Category A and Category B. Effectiveness is shown as precision at 10 documents
returned (P@10) as a function of the fraction of the corpus that is labeled “spam”.
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Then we proceed in a greedy fashion to build the new ranked list r′ from the original
r:
r′[1] = r[min{i|score(r[i]) ≥ tk}] (14)
r′[i > 1] = r[min i|score(r[i] ≥ tk and r[i] /∈ r
′[1, i− 1]] ,except (15)
when equation 15 is undefined, in which case
r′[i > 1] = r[i] . (16)
The special case is occasioned by the fact that tk is not necessarily monotonic in k due
to noise in the training examples.
This reranking method was applied independently to each TREC ad hoc Category
A submission, using our fusion filter’s percentile scores. Table 7 shows estP30, estP300
and estRP for each pair of original and reranked results, along with the average over all
runs and the P-value for the difference. Figure 8 shows StatMAP, MAP (unjudged not
relevant), and MAP (unjudged elided). All measures show a substantial improvement
for nearly all runs. The notable exception is the run labeled watwp which, ironically, is
20
Fig. 9 Other P@10 estimates for Category A ad hoc runs, fusion filter.
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Table 7 Effect of spam reranking on TREC ad hoc submissions, Category A. Representative
cutoff depths and R-precision show improvement at all ranks.
estP30 estP300 estRP
Run ID orig. rerank orig rerank orig rerank
MS1 0.3728 0.4029 0.3506 0.3841 0.2999 0.3282
MS2 0.3921 0.3891 0.3702 0.3837 0.3479 0.3646
MSRAAF 0.3751 0.4271 0.3793 0.4280 0.3748 0.3944
MSRAC 0.3925 0.4397 0.3807 0.4284 0.3891 0.4074
MSRANORM 0.3949 0.4370 0.3812 0.4294 0.3751 0.3975
Sab9wtBase 0.2472 0.3248 0.3061 0.3119 0.2788 0.2880
Sab9wtBf1 0.3031 0.3526 0.3219 0.3407 0.3113 0.3147
Sab9wtBf2 0.2737 0.3105 0.3154 0.3226 0.2932 0.3010
THUIR09An 0.3485 0.3575 0.3008 0.3062 0.2858 0.2924
THUIR09LuTA 0.2321 0.3493 0.3123 0.3893 0.2965 0.3298
THUIR09TxAn 0.3356 0.4189 0.3411 0.4094 0.3188 0.3474
UMHOObm25GS 0.1653 0.4121 0.2586 0.3523 0.2540 0.3334
UMHOObm25IF 0.1640 0.3105 0.2329 0.3297 0.2201 0.2897
UMHOOqlGS 0.1359 0.4238 0.2402 0.3246 0.2380 0.3160
UMHOOqlIF 0.1326 0.4069 0.2396 0.3364 0.2373 0.3236
WatSdmrm3 0.1224 0.4221 0.2361 0.3290 0.2431 0.3132
WatSdmrm3we 0.1905 0.5587 0.3062 0.4267 0.3090 0.3927
WatSql 0.1111 0.4229 0.2356 0.3188 0.2361 0.3117
muadanchor 0.3316 0.3909 0.3311 0.3737 0.3097 0.3367
muadibm5 0.2881 0.3638 0.3376 0.3935 0.3539 0.3727
muadimp 0.2886 0.3716 0.3372 0.3930 0.3513 0.3694
pkuLink 0.1581 0.4766 0.2694 0.3887 0.2558 0.3353
pkuSewmTp 0.1600 0.3863 0.2558 0.3429 0.2473 0.3319
pkuStruct 0.1595 0.3894 0.2514 0.3408 0.2469 0.3320
twCSrs9N 0.2376 0.2818 0.2945 0.3719 0.2800 0.3189
twCSrsR 0.2059 0.4180 0.2962 0.3607 0.2807 0.3318
twJ48rsU 0.2501 0.2877 0.2727 0.2994 0.2610 0.2802
uogTrdphP 0.2194 0.4561 0.2994 0.4146 0.2764 0.3606
uvaee 0.1400 0.4160 0.2709 0.3538 0.2808 0.3432
uvamrf 0.1178 0.4285 0.2564 0.3512 0.2493 0.3426
uvamrftop 0.3516 0.4468 0.3049 0.3668 0.3057 0.3493
watprf 0.3040 0.3081 0.2976 0.3033 0.3067 0.3047
watrrfw 0.3511 0.3513 0.2826 0.2854 0.2950 0.2989
watwp 0.3389 0.3303 0.2310 0.2310 0.2311 0.2332
yhooumd09BFM 0.1828 0.4018 0.2580 0.3666 0.2532 0.3299
yhooumd09BGC 0.3520 0.4804 0.3102 0.3851 0.2817 0.3311
yhooumd09BGM 0.3689 0.4594 0.3065 0.3811 0.2795 0.3284
Average 0.2567 0.3949 0.2965 0.3582 0.2880 0.3318
P-value (1-tailed) < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
the author’s submission. This run consists entirely of Wikipedia documents, so it is not
surprising that spam filtering does not improve it! watprf is the only other run that
is not improved in terms of both estRP and MAP (unjudged elided), leading us to
suggest that the other few cases are outliers, perhaps due to to the bias of incomplete
relevance assessment.
7 Discussion
While it is common knowledge that the purpose of web spam is to subvert the pur-
pose of information retrieval methods, a relevance-based quantitative assessment of its
impact — or of methods to mitigate its impact — has not previously been reported.
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Table 8 Effect of spam reranking on TREC ad hoc submissions, Category A. Representative
cutoff depths and R-precision show improvement at all ranks.
StatMAP MAP (unj. nonrel.) MAP (unj. elided)
Run ID orig. rerank orig rerank orig rerank
MS1 0.0419 0.0488 0.0597 0.0646 0.1346 0.1479
MS2 0.0619 0.0655 0.0806 0.0811 0.1554 0.1609
MSRAAF 0.0484 0.0538 0.0754 0.0783 0.1489 0.1639
MSRAC 0.0534 0.0605 0.0795 0.0858 0.1550 0.1715
MSRANORM 0.0509 0.0572 0.0763 0.0813 0.1537 0.1695
Sab9wtBase 0.0225 0.0244 0.0338 0.0310 0.0783 0.0886
Sab9wtBf1 0.0388 0.0382 0.0480 0.0436 0.1031 0.1088
Sab9wtBf2 0.0274 0.0292 0.0403 0.0376 0.0866 0.0914
THUIR09An 0.0301 0.0312 0.0460 0.0477 0.0826 0.0869
THUIR09LuTA 0.0378 0.0438 0.0490 0.0524 0.1146 0.1385
THUIR09TxAn 0.0480 0.0562 0.0653 0.0717 0.1353 0.1586
UMHOObm25GS 0.0414 0.0651 0.0641 0.0920 0.1295 0.1866
UMHOObm25IF 0.0273 0.0354 0.0385 0.0496 0.0971 0.1322
UMHOOqlGS 0.0338 0.0600 0.0554 0.0900 0.1179 0.1791
UMHOOqlIF 0.0307 0.0552 0.0518 0.0856 0.1116 0.1754
WatSdmrm3 0.0338 0.0547 0.0580 0.0839 0.1261 0.1786
WatSdmrm3we 0.0596 0.0885 0.0919 0.1284 0.1717 0.2498
WatSql 0.0310 0.0557 0.0517 0.0861 0.1159 0.1775
muadanchor 0.0148 0.0246 0.0225 0.0302 0.0553 0.0645
muadibm5 0.0396 0.0553 0.0443 0.0596 0.1467 0.1702
muadimp 0.0394 0.0559 0.0444 0.0607 0.1476 0.1728
pkuLink 0.0319 0.0552 0.0429 0.0690 0.1000 0.1582
pkuSewmTp 0.0361 0.0582 0.0543 0.0773 0.1131 0.1667
pkuStruct 0.0376 0.0596 0.0566 0.0796 0.1154 0.1703
twCSrs9N 0.0168 0.0259 0.0271 0.0363 0.0861 0.1046
twCSrsR 0.0232 0.0390 0.0370 0.0510 0.1014 0.1316
twJ48rsU 0.0200 0.0228 0.0262 0.0286 0.0653 0.0720
uogTrdphP 0.0406 0.0623 0.0627 0.0878 0.1322 0.1905
uvaee 0.0475 0.0804 0.0653 0.0961 0.1371 0.2011
uvamrf 0.0355 0.0641 0.0579 0.0961 0.1201 0.1869
uvamrftop 0.0867 0.0974 0.1058 0.1198 0.1832 0.2187
watprf 0.0628 0.0633 0.0633 0.0602 0.1082 0.1087
watrrfw 0.0723 0.0738 0.0834 0.0834 0.1539 0.1593
watwp 0.0486 0.0496 0.0496 0.0491 0.0772 0.0770
yhooumd09BFM 0.0248 0.0394 0.0357 0.0544 0.1006 0.1495
yhooumd09BGC 0.0442 0.0552 0.0674 0.0773 0.1359 0.1667
yhooumd09BGM 0.0385 0.0478 0.0593 0.0672 0.1259 0.1518
Average 0.0400 0.0528 0.0560 0.0696 0.1195 0.1510
P-value (1-tailed) < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Measurements of the prevalence of spam in retrieved results and the ability of filters to
identify this spam give some indication but do not tell the whole story. The bottom line
is: How much does spam hurt, and how much is this hurt salved by spam filtering? For
both questions, we offer a lower bound which is substantial. A simple on-line logistic
regression filter dramatically improves the effectiveness of systems participating in the
TREC 2009 web ad hoc and relevance feedback tasks, including those from major Web
search providers, some of which employ their own spam filters. One may infer from
the improvement that the impact of spam is similarly substantial. Unless, that is, the
spam filter is learning some aspect of page quality apart from spamminess. We find this
explanation unlikely, as the AUC scores indicate that the filters indeed identify spam.
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In any event the distinction is moot: If the filters have serendipitously discovered some
other aspect of static relevance, what is the harm?
At the time of writing, graph-based quality and spam metrics for ClueWeb09 were
still in preparation by a third party [private communication, Carlos Castillo, Andras
Benczur], and we did not have the means to anticipate the results of this major under-
taking. When they do become available, they may be easily compared to and perhaps
combined with ours to form a super meta-filter.
Several of the TREC 2009 submissions already incorporated some form of spam
filtering. The yhooumd00BGM run, for example [18], used Yahoo’s spam labels and
a learning method to improve its P@10 score from 0.1420 to 0.4040. Our reranking
improves it further to 0.4724. The authors of uvamrftop [17] also paid particular at-
tention to spam; our method improves its result from 0.4100 to 0.4855. twJ48rsU [11]is
similarly improved from 0.2380 to 0.2801.
For those who wish to experiment with any of these approaches, or simply to apply
the filters as described here, we make the four sets of percentile scores available for
download. Using a custom compressor/decompressor, each is about 350MB compressed
and 16GB uncompressed9.
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